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IV

JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-22(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ...,
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction^]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transfeiTed this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which statutes provide that the Supreme Court may
transfer any matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment after a finding

of no genuine issues of material fact.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly found that if there actually was an agreement

between these parties that each of the terms of the agreement should be given equal weight,
and in particular, where one party reserved himself the right to rescind or modify the
agreement up and until a written agreement was drafted and fully executed, and each of the
parties assented to that term through their further communications and actions, if that term
should be maintained as a part of the agreement.

1

Utah Const., Article VIII, §5.

2

Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended).
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this court should apply the same standard as
that applied by the trial court. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).
Accordingly, this court should review the trial court's decision for correctness. See, e.g.,
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
Whether a contract exists between parties is a question of law; therefore, this Court
should review the trial court's conclusion of law under a correction of error standard. Bailey
v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); accord
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL
There are none.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
The parties in this case were involved in negotiations regarding the purchase and sale
by 1-800 Contacts, Inc. of Lensfast, LLC. The principle agent for 1-800 Contacts was
Jonathan Coon. The principle agent for Lensfast was Randolph Weigner, who is also a
named Defendant in this case. Toward that end, emails were sent back and forth between
2

the parties, which contained terms for the agreement. A pail of those terms, which the lower
Court relied upon in making it's decision, reserved the right for Lensfast, LLC to rescind or
modify the agreement up and until a written agreement was drafted and executed by the
parties. See Ct. Rec. 12, 105. Although a written agreement was eventually drafted, it was
not accepted by Lensfast, LLC and therefore was never executed. 1-800 Contacts, Inc.
brought this action alleging two causes of action, one for declaratory judgment requesting
the Court determine the existence of the agreement, and a second for specific performance
requesting the Court to enforce the terms of the agreement as 1-800 Contacts saw them.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
On August 25, 2004, Lensfast filed it's Motion for Summary Judgment along with
an accompanying memorandum. See Ct. Rec. 29-54. 1-800 Contacts filed an Opposition
on September 17, 2004. See Ct. Rec. 55-76. Lensfast filed it's reply on September 27,
2004.

See Ct. Rec. 77-93. Each party submitted the matter for decision on or about

October 13, 2004 or October 14, 2004. See Ct. Rec. 94-99. Oral argument was held
December 13, 2004.

On that same date, the Court entered it's Ruling and Order

granting Lensfast's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Ct. Rec. 104-110. A copy of the
Ruling and Order is attached in the Appendix as Addendum 1 to this brief.
Facts Established in the Record Below:
1.

In late March or early April of this year, the parties had a telephone

conversation in which Plaintiff indicated an interest in purchasing the assets of Defendant's
company. See Ct. Rec. 105.

3

2.

Following the telephone conversation, a series of email messages were sent

between the parties beginning on the morning of April 13, 2004, which stated:
"Jonathan,
This is an offer in principal to sell you the assets of Lensfast
LLC including the domain name contactlens.com for $800,000.00.
This offer is entirely dependent on my agreement with your
attorney's terms and conditions for the acquisition and is not to be
considered legally binding until a physically executed contract
between our two companies is completed.
Until the time said contract is executed I may, at my sole
discretion, rescind or modify this offer in any way I see fit.
The contract must include a provision to have the entire $800,000.00
placed in escrow with my attorney, Peter Tannenwald of Irving,
Campbell & Tannenwald in Washington, DC prior to transferring any
assets of Lensfast LLC to 800 Contacts.
Thank you for your offer and please have your attorney contact me at
your earliest convenience.
Sincerely,
Randolph Weigner
Lensfast LLC
(800) Lensfast (536-7327)"

(Emphasis added) See Addendum A of Appellant's brief. See also Ct. Rec. 12.
3.

Coon sent to Weigner an email in response to Weigner's April 13,2004 email

as follows:
"Randy:

4

Sorry for the delay. Your email got screened by our junk mail
program. I have added this email address to Outlook and my whitelist,
so it should come through next time.
We accept your offer to sell and agree to purchase the assets of
LensFast LLC including: contactlens.com, lensfast.com, the name
LensFast, the customer database for any lensfast related companies,
and any related internet domains or phone numbers associated with
LensFast LLC.
Standard with any transasaction of this magnitude (and as we did with
contactlenses.com), we will also expect a one year non-compete.
Consideration will be included as part of the $800k purchase price.
We will accept Campbell & Tannenwald as the escrow agent. Email
back acceptance (just an email that says "we are in agreement on this
email") and we will get to work on a short definitive agreement.
This email from the 13th was clearly written by counsel. I sent it to our
counsel and they wrote a lengthy response which they asked me to send
back. I tossed a bunch of the CYA stuff and boiled it down to this
email. Let's both try to keep this simple. I have asked our counsel
to keep the document short and in plain English. I can't guarantee
that someone getting paid by the hour won't try to make things more
complicated, but let's both direct our counsel not to run up the bill on
this.
We either have an agreement or we don't. If we do, lets get it done. If
we don't, let's not waste each other's time and resources playing tennis
with a document.
Thanks,
-Jonathan
(Emphasis added) See Addendum A of Appellant's brief. See also Ct. Rec. 11.
4.

Pursuant to that email, Appellant expressed acceptance of Lensfast's offer, but

indicated that he also wanted a one-year non-compete agreement. Id.
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5.

That email also invites acceptance of the new non-compete term by return e-

mail stating simply "we are in agreement on this email" and then indicated that after
acceptance, u we will get to work on a short definitive agreement." See Ct. Rec. 10, 107.
6. •

On April 15, 2004, Weigner responded agreeing to the previous terms except

for the non-compete agreement, which he advised required some modification because of
a previous contractual obligation. See Addendum A of Appellant's brief. See also Ct. Rec.
10, 107.
7.

On April 16, 2004, in reference to the drafting of a written agreement, Coon

infonned Weigner that "[they] should have something to you next week." See Addendum
A of Appellant's brief. See also Ct. Rec. 9, 10, 107, 108.
8.

On April 16,2004, Weigner requested that Coon have "his legal people draw

up the contract." Id.
9.

Coon responded by sending an email to their counsel, asking that he "prepare

a brief plain English agreement using the agreed upon terms below." Id.
10.

Coon then copied the same email sent to his counsel, to Weigner and stated

that "we should have something to you next week." Id.
11.

There has never been a signed agreement between the parties. See Ct. Rec.

29-36,91-93.
12.

Weigner did not agree to all the terms of the written agreement. Id.

13.

Weigner at all times understood that all of the both oral and email

conversations between the parties were negotiations preliminary to the entry of an actual
6

agreement, which would be written, reviewed, and signed before it was finalized. Id. See
also, Ct. Rec. 43, 61 ^[ 16.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1-800 Contacts argues that lower court erred when it concluded that 1-800 Contacts
was not entitled to specific performance of the alleged agreement between these parties.
That conclusion was based upon a "Catch 22" within which 1-800 Contacts finds
themselves. The lower court specifically found that at all times the parties had agreed and
contemplated that the agreement was conditioned upon the drafting and execution of a final
written contract. See Ct. Rec. 109. 1-800 Contacts takes issue with this finding, alleging
that the agreement already existed to a sufficient degree within the emails the parties
exchanged regarding the sale and purchase. Even if that were true, however, the lower court
correctly found that if there is an agreement based upon the terms included within the
emails, that Lensfast specifically reserved itself the right to rescind or modify the agreement
up and until a written agreement was fully executed containing all the terms of the sale. Id.
1-800 Contacts wishes to ignore that provision of the agreement even though each of the
emails between the parties and including one email to 1-800 Contact's counsel, that
followed the April 13th email, indicated their assent and a requirement that such an
agreement be drafted and finally executed. See Ct. Rec. 7-12, see also Addendum to
Appellant's brief. In fact, 1-800 Contacts actually did draft such an agreement further
demonstrating by their actions their acceptance of that term. If all the terms for the
agreement were already contained in the emails, why would they draft an additional
7

agreement for signature? Because it was recognized as a requirement, something 1-800
Contacts admitted to as an undisputed fact. See Ct. Rec. 61.
If there was no agreement, specific performance is impossible. If there was an
agreement, Lensfast reserved the right to rescind or modify the agreement, which it did, and
upon which the lower court correctly based it's decision to dismiss the complaint by
summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

If There Was an Agreement, It Includes ALL Terms.

Plaintiff essentially argues that it should be allowed to pick and choose what it
believes to be the relevant parts of the "agreement" between these parties. Defendant has
always asserted that there does not exist any agreement between these parties. To the extent
there was an agreement, it was contingent upon the final acceptance and execution of a
written agreement. Plaintiff alleges the existence of a binding and enforceable agreement,
and bases that allegation upon emails sent between these parties. Those emails, which
Plaintiff relies upon for its allegation of a binding agreement, clearly include terms which
Plaintiff wishes to ignore. Those terms were clear and undisputed at the trial level allowing
the trial court to appropriately find summary judgment. Defendants' summary judgment
should be affirmed.
Appellant argues that the trial court exceeded his bounds by determining the intent
of the parties with regard to the terms of the agreement. At the same time, they have asserted
a cause of action requesting that the Court declare there to be a valid and enforceable
8

contract based upon a collection of emails between these parties. Those arguments don't
jive, they are mutually exclusive. How can the Court detennine the existence of an
agreement without an examination of the terms contained within what Appellant has
presented to be the four corners of the document. 'The meaning and effect that a contract
is to be given depends primarily on the intent of the parties; and such intent is to be
ascertained first by looking within the four corners of the agreement itself." Foote v. Taylor,
635 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1981). Which is exactly what the Court did.
On April 13th, Mr. Weigner emailed Mr. Coon stating: 'This is an offer in principal
[sic][.]" See Ct. Rec. 12. He then goes on to include some of the terms of the offer, one of
which reserves Mr. Weigner the right to rescind or modify the agreement up and until the
time the agreement is put in writing by Mr. Coon's attorney and fully executed. Id. Clearly
at this point there is no agreement.
On April 15th, Mr. Coon replies, "We accept your offer to sell and agree to purchase
the assets of Lensfast LLC [.]" See Ct. Rec. 11. If there is actually an agreement between
these parties, Mr. Weigner's offer was clearly accepted at that time by Mr. Coon. That
acceptance must include the right to rescind, because that was a part of the offer being
accepted. Accepting it cannot simply read out of the terms the right to rescind. So there is
still no final agreement because if this "acceptance" intended to alter the right to rescind,
then there is no meeting of the minds. If, however, it does not alter the right to rescind, then
the right remained and the agreement was rescinded. Either way there is no right to make
the claim Plaintiff made below.
9

Mr. Coon's "acceptance" includes an additional new term requiring a one-year
noncompete agreement, and states nothing about Mr. Weigner's reservation of right to
rescind or modify, except to assent to it by indicated that he would have his attorney keep
the document short and in plain English. See. Ct. Rec. 11. He invites acceptance to the new
term regarding the non-compete agreement by requesting there be certain language added,
which Mr. Weigner does in an email that same day. See Ct. Rec. 10. Each of them, the
following day reiterate the requirement to put the agreement in writing. See Ct. Rec. 9. Mr.
Coon, in fact cc's an email sent to his counsel requesting that he draft an agreement to Mr.
Weigner. See Ct. Rec. 9.
Examining the four corners of the document, if there actually is an agreement
between these parties, one of the terms, which is not disputed at any time, and which is
continually assented to and reaffirmed is the requirement to have the agreement put in
writing at Mr. Weigner's request. That request specifically reserved the right to rescind or
modify the agreement in any way up until it became a fully executed written agreement, and
that Mr. Weigner agreed with the terms drafted in that agreement. See Ct. Rec. 9-12. It is
the Court's responsibility to determine the terms of the agreement as a matter of law. See
Bailey v. Call 161 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 113 P.2d45 (Utah 1989);
accord Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). A trial court's finding
about whether a party accepted an offer or a counteroffer is a finding of fact. Kimball v.
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714,716 (Utah 1985). That is exactly what the trial court did. It did not
have to weigh the intentions of the parties as it found certain terms to be clear.
10

Appellant's arguments that the requirement to formalize the agreement in writing are
contrary to their own admissions. In response to Defendants' Statement of Fact, paragraph
16 in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellant
specifically states that "Plaintiff does not dispute that Weigner understood that there would
be a final written agreement." See Ct. Rec. 61. They further state that tk[t]he oral
communications and e-mails exchanged between April 13 and April 16 make it abundantly
clear that the parties had reached an agreement on the material terms of the purchase
agreement[.]" See Ct. Rec. 61-62. Appellants further state that "Mr. Coon's April 15 e-mail
to Weigner constituted both an acceptance of Weigner's offer to sell the assets of Lensfast
set forth in Weigner's April 13 email, including the domain name contactlens.com, and an
offer by Mr. Coon relating to the need for a one-year covenant not to compete." See Ct.
Rec. 57. The trial court could not find it any other way. Plaintiff did not dispute the
existence of that term to the trial court, it was therefore found to be appropriately included
if there actually was an agreement between these parties.
The trial court in it's ruling made this point with clarity.
"While the Plaintiff would construe the statement made by Defendant in the
April 13 e-mail that no agreement between the parties would be considered
binding until a physically executed contract between the parties is completed
as meaning merely that there was an intention to memorialize the agreement
reached through e-mail correspondence, the clear language of those e-mails
belies that assertion. It is upon the written documents alleged to have formed
agreement itself that the Court must base its decision, and no upon one party's
interpretation of that document. There is no ambiguity in Defendant's
reservation of the right to rescind or modify his offer until a forma contract
was executed by counsel. Nor is there any ambiguity in the e-mails - the very

11

documentation which Plaintiff now contends establishes the terms of the
agreement- that Plaintiff did not consent to Defendant's conditional offer."
SeeCt. Rec. 109.
If there actually was an agreement between these parties, it included a specific
reservation of rights to rescind or modify by Mr. Weigner. That was not disputed at the trial
court and in fact was found to be true. There was no requirement to weigh evidence to make
that determination, and there was no error in making that determination.
II.

There Was No Error in Finding the Agreement Could Not be Enforced.

Under Utah law, the party claiming that there is a contract has the burden to prove
that ''there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by
its terms. Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the
parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed." Bunnell v. Bills,
368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962), overruled in part on other grounds by Leigh Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 302-04 (Utah 1982). The trial court found in this case,
that to the extent there was actually an agreement between the parties, Mr. Weigner had
reserved for himself the right to rescind or modify the agreement until it was fully executed.
Appellant, dissatisfied with that finding, now argues it was error for the trial court not to
find the agreement could not be specifically enforced.

Specific performance of the

agreement, however, would be inappropriate given the fact that there was never a written
and fully executed agreement, although such was contemplated and agreed to by the parties.
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Even if that term did not exist, which it does, specific performance still would not be
appropriate. It is often said that a greater degree of certainty is required in the terms of a
contract which is to be specifically enforced in equity than is necessary in one which is to
be the basis of an action at law for damages. See Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 423 P.2d 491, 18
Utah 2d 368 (1967). "Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to the
sense of justice and good conscience of the [trial] court, and accordingly, considerable
latitude of discretion is allowed in [the] determination as to whether it shall be granted and
what judgment should be entered

" Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981). It

is a widely applied hornbook concept that specific performance is not available as a remedy
where there is not an enforceable contractual agreement. The section of Am. Jur.2d relating
to this issue states that:
"the existence of a valid contract is essential to the remedy of specific
performance. In order for equity to decree specific performance, it is
necessary that there be in existence and in effect a contract valid at law and
binding upon the party against whom performance is sought, for specific
performance is never applicable where there is no obligation to perform. If
the existence of a valid contract is matter of doubt, equity will not decree
specific performance.
Tentative arrangements which were never
consummated and never made final cannot form the subject matter of an
action to compel specific performance. And a mere agreement to enter into
a contract in the future is not specifically enforceable in equity."
71 AmJur2d § 13.
The courts in Utah are in agreement with that general rule. "Specific performance
cannot be required unless all terms of the agreement are clear. The court cannot compel the
performance of a contract which the parties did not mutually agree upon." Pitcher v.

13

Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491, 18 Utah 2d 368 (1967). A binding contract can exist only where
there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its
terms. Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the
parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed. See Bunnell v.
Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962). "Under the circumstances shown to exist
here, where there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be
entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought
to have made and enforce it." Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29
(1961). When the parties leave material matters so obscure and undefined that the court
cannot say whether the minds of the parties met upon all the essentials or upon what
substantial terms they agreed, the case is not one for specific performance. See D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Brown, 439 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1971) (quoting with approval 49
Am.Jur. Specific Performance § 22). Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App.
1988)
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and ambiguity so as to leave
nothing to conjecture or to be supplied by the court. See Pitcher. It must be sufficiently
certain and definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended,
and no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity is called upon to have performed, and
it must sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court may enforce it as actually made
by the parties. Id. Whenever it appears that material matters are not clear, certain, and
complete, but are left by the parties so obscure or undefined that the court cannot say
14

whether or not the minds of the parties met upon all the essential particulars, or if they did,
the court cannot say exactly upon what substantial terms they agreed, the case is not one for
specific performance. See D.H, Overmyer Co. at 929.
To the extent that there was any agreement between the parties, it was an agreement
in principal and simply a nebulous notion discussed by the parties. That agreement in
principal cannot be enforced absent a final, clear, specific agreement with terms which the
Court can enforce, rather than first write before enforcing. To enforce it at this point would
require that this Court make up terms to fill in the gaps that were not filled in by the parties.
The trial court determined that to be inappropriate and chose not to fill in those gaps. That
is not the court's responsibility.
Defendants rely upon Barker v. Francis, 141 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for the
general assertion that all the terms of an agreement need not be definite for specific
performance, only the material ones. In that case, even though the parties had each signed
an Earnest Money Agreement, (a written, signed agreement) which the court found to be
valid and binding, the court refused to grant specific performance due to a finding of
impossibility of performance. That was significantly more than the parties have in this case.
There is no writing, other than the email communications, none of which are executed, and
all of which require or contemplate the preparation and execution of written agreement.
Furthermore, that case involved only the swap of some land. This case involves the
purchase and sale of an entire business and all the appurtenances that go with it. Subject and
price are not sufficient.
15

III.

To the Extent that the Agreement Was Preliminary, Weigner Still is
Under No Obligation to Perform.

Lastly Plaintiff presents an argument regarding a "Preliminary Agreement." That
issue and that argument was never presented to the lower Court, neither in their oppositional
memoranda, nor in the argument before the Court. It is therefore inappropriately brought
to this Court and should be stricken. Even if it were appropriately before this Court, it is
without merit, and still does not require Lensfast to sell 1-800 Contacts the business. Nor
does it provide this Court the appropriate authority to reverse summary judgment.
tc

[I]f the preliminary writing was not intended to be binding on the parties at all, the

writing is a mere proposal, and neither party has an obligation to negotiate further."
Adjustntev. GAB Bus. Sews.Jnc,

145F.3d543,548 (2dCir. 1998). A binding preliminary

commitment is created "when the parties agree on certain major terms, but leave other terms
open for further negotiation." Id. A preliminary commitment is basically an "agreement to
agree," and requires that the parties negotiate and act in good faith in their attempts to reach
a final agreement. See id.\ P.A. Bergner&Co. v. Martinez, 823 F. Supp. 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). While a party who enters into a binding preliminary commitment must act in good
faith, the party "has no right to demand performance of the transaction." Adjustrite, 145 F.3d
at 548.
'There does not appear to be any doubt that if the parties make it clear that they do
not intend that there should be legal consequences unless and until a formal writing is
executed, there is no contract until that time." Engineering Assoc., 622 P.2d at 787. See R.J.
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Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah 1952) (explaining that "'if an intention
is manifested in any way that legal obligations between the parties shall be deferred until the
writing is made, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract'")
(quoting Restatement of Contracts § 26 cmt. a (1932)). Such is the case here.
On facts similar to those of the instant case, the court in Doll v. Grand Union Co.,
925 F.2d 1363, 1370 (11th Cir. 1991) concluded that it was "unwilling to allow a jury to
infer an agreement to sign a lease when one of the parties specifically declared its intention
not to be bound until a lease was drafted and signed by both parties." 925 F.2d at 1370. The
court explained that while enforcing a verbal agreement may be justified where the evidence
suggests that this was the intent of the parties, "when the parties make their intentions [not
to be bound absent a formal executed agreement] clear, there is no basis for a court to step
in and contradict their explicit desires." Id. See 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts
§ 2.9, at 149-50 (revised ed. 1993); see also Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. Irving Place Assoc,
Inc., 622 P.2d 784,787 (Utah 1980) ("if the parties make it clear that they do not intend that
there should be legal consequences unless and until a formal writing is executed, there is no
contract until that time"); accord Triax Pacific. Inc. v. American Ins. Co. .Civ. No. 94-4091,
1995 WL 643156, at *5 (10th Cir. 1995).
The parties in this case made it clear that there would be a written and executed
agreement before either party was bound. That never materialized. All Lensfast was
required to do, under the law relied upon by Appellants, was to negotiate in good faith. That
does not give Appellant the right to specific performance of an agreement which never made
17

it to finality. Or, if it did make it to finality, the right to rescind was included and that right
was exercised. The trial court's decision to dismiss this case on summary judgment was
correct and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and the law, Appellees respectfully request this
Court deny Appellant's request to reverse the trial court and that this Court affirm the trial
court's granting of summary judgment.
DATED this

77r

day of May, 2005.
NELSON, SNIFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
/I

^envertL SjuiffevJr.
Daniel B. GacHott j
Attorney for Appellees
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CONTACTS

RULING and ORDER

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 040911552

1-800

HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK

vs .

DATE: December 13, 2004

RANDOLPH WEIGNER, et al
Defendants

This matter came before the Court December 13, 2004, for oral
argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant was

present

Garriott

through

Denver

C.

Snuffer

and

Daniel

B.

and

plaintiff was present through Paxton R. Guymon and Joel T. Zenger.
Defendant filed his motion on August 25, 2004, to which Plaintiff's
opposition was received on September 17, 2004.
was

filed on September

27.

Plaintiff

Plaintiff's Reply

submitted

his motion

for

decision on October 13, 2004, and Defendant independently submitted
the matter for decision, with request for oral argument on October
14.

Oral argument was heard on this matter on December 13, 2004.

Having

considered

the

case

file,

the Morion

and

the

Memoranda

submitted by the parties, and the arguments made in open court, the
Court enters the following decision:
BACKGROUND

Defendants ask this Court to summarily dismiss this action for
specific

performance

because

they believe

that

the

undisputed

material facts demonstrate that the parties never entered into an
enforceable contract.
Material

to

the

present

issue,

the

following

facts

are

undisputed.
In late March or early April of this year, the parties had a
telephone conversation in which Plaintiff indicated an interest in
purchasing

the assets

telephone

conversation,

of
a

Defendant's
series

company.

Following

of email messages

were

the
sent

between the parties beginning on the morning of April 13, 2004.
The

initial

principal

email,

which

identifies

itself

as

an

"offer

in

[sic] to sell . . . the assets of LensFast LLC', sets

forth certain desired conditions, including that the
offer is entirely dependent upon [Defendant's]
agreement with [Plaintiff's] attorney's terms
and conditions for the acquisition and is not
to be considered legally binding until a
physically executed contract between [the] two
companies is completed.
Until the time said contract is executed I may,
at my sole discretion, rescind or modify this
offer in any way I see fit.
E-mail

messages, attached

as Exhibit A to Complaint,

Affidavit and Coon Affidavit.

Weigner

The e-mail concludes with specific

designation of the acceptable manner of payment.

Plaintiff's e-mail response to the letter was sent some time
before

12:25

p.m.

on

April

15,

and

expressed

acceptance

of

Defendant's "offer, " but indicated that Plaxitiff wanted a one-year
non-compete agreement.

The e-mail invited acceptance of the new

term by return e-mail stating simply "we are _n agreement on this
e-mail'' and then indicated that after acceptance, "we will get to
work on a short definitive agreement."

It concluded by stating:

I have asked our counsel to keep the document
short and in plain English. I can't guarantee
that someone getting paid by the hour won' t
try to make things more complicated, but let's
both direct our counsel not to run up the bill
on this. We either agree or we don't. If we
do, let's get it done. If we don't let's not
waste each other's time and resources playing
tennis with a document.
Id.
Defendant sent his return e-mail on April 15, at 12:25 p.m.,
stating simply: "We are m

agreement on this e-mail."

The e-mail

then identified a required refinement to Plaintiff's proposed noncompete agreement, but nothing more.
The next correspondence contained m
morning of April 16, m

Exhibit A occurred on the

which Defendant asked Plaintiff to have

"your legal people draw upon the contract." Plaintiff responded by
sending an e-mail to its counsel, asking that he "prepare a brief
plain English agreement using the agreed upon terms below."
3

In

what appears to be a copy of the e-mail sent to counsel, Plaintiff
told Defendant that "we should have something to you next week."
DISCUSSION
The

general

rule,

as

stated

in

Restatement

(Second)

of

Contracts § 27, and quoted in Plaintiff's Memorandum, is that
Manifestations
of
assent
that
are
in
themselves sufficient to conclude a contract
will not be prevented from so operating by the
fact that the parties also manifest an
intention to prepare and adopt a written
memorial thereof; but the circumstances may
show that the agreements are preliminary
negotiations.
Id.

However, the facts of this case, as shown by the pleadings and

attachments,

demonstrate

that

this matter

is

governed

by a

corollary to the rule as addressed in comment b:
On the other hand, if either party knows or
has reason to know that the other party
regards the agreement as incomplete and
intends that no obligation shall exist until
other terms are assented to or until the whole
has been reduced to another written form, the
preliminary negotiations and agreements do not
constitute a contract.
Id. at comment b.

The courts of this jurisdiction have affirmed

this fundamental tenet of contract law in stating:
There does not appear to be any doubt that if
the parties make it clear that they do not
intend that there should be legal consequences
unless and until a formal writing is executed,
there is no contract until that time.

Engineering A s s o c , Inc. v. Irving Place Assoc.; Inc. , 62 2 P. 2 d
784,

787

statement

(Utah 1980) .
made

by

While the Plamtif: would

Defendant

in

the

April

13

construe the

e-mail

that

no

agreement between the parties would be considered binding until a
physically executed contract between the parties is completed as
meaning merely

that there was an intention

to memorialize

the

agreement reached through e-mail correspondence, the clear language
of those e-mails belies that assertion.

It is upon the written

documents alleged to have formed agreement itself that the Court
must base its decision, and not upon one party' s interpretation of
that document.

There is no ambiguity in Defendant's reservation of

the right to rescind or modify his offer until a formal contract
was executed by counsel.
mails—the
establishes

very
the

Nor is there any ambiguity in the e-

documentation

which

Plaintiff

terms of the agreement-that

now

Plaintiff

contends
did

not

consent to Defendant's conditional offer.
Plaintiff argues the court is not to weigh evidence and if
there

is any dispute

in material

fact, the ]ury must

whether the parties intended an agreement.

resolve

While that is true, the

court must also examine the facts set forth through the prism of
the burden of proof borne by the parties.

5

While the parties can

and do disagree on what the series of e-mails means, the court
believes that as a matter of law those are clear.
Even if there was a contract and agreement on essential terms,
until something was executed and signed, defendant could rescind it
at his discretion.
Because there was no formally executed contract based on the
facts the court determines are not in genuine dispute, the law
requires Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

n
DATED t h i s

( /

d a y of

December,

2004.

/

.' /

BRUCE C. LUBECK
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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